The Predictioneer's Game

The following are excerpts from this book by Dr. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a political scientist, senior fellow at the Stanford University Hoover Institution, and game theorist.

"... Cambodia's Pol Pot ... ordered the murder of millions of Cambodians for such crimes as wearing eyeglasses (proof that they were educated and therefore probably a threat to the regime)." (pg. xii)

"The difference between doing a good job and doing a lousy job is driven by how many people a leader has to keep happy." (pg. xiii)

"All that is needed is a tool ... that ... evaluates [information] by assuming that everyone does what they think is best for them ... progress being made in demystifying the world of human thought and decision." (pg. xix)

"Prediction with game theory ... means empathizing with how others think about the same problems." (pg. xx)

"... what game theorists call a 'costly signal'." (pg. 4)

"To be a successful prognosticator, it is critical to think about ... what [others] think, what they think you think, what you think they think. what you think they think you think ... the existence of something called the national interest - may be just a strategic fiction created by politicians for their own advantage instead of ours ... how to use logic to cut through the fog of language." (pg. 11)

"Lies are a part of strategizing ... When promises and interests differ, people ... do whatever they think will benefit them most." (pg. 12)

"Trust but verify." (pg. 13)

"Rational people know when to stop searching [for information] - when enough is enough ... people with crazy ideas can be perfectly rational." (pg. 16)

"Sometimes we have to make decisions even though we are in the dark about the consequences." (pg. 17)

"... manage the range of consequences ..." "... people act on expectations ..." "Tipping is illegal in China." (pg. 18)

"... our leaders really are free to pursue their own interests and to call that the national interest or the corporate interest." (pg. 24)

"The key to any of these games is sorting out the difference between knowledge and beliefs." (pg. 25)

"... whether what they believe is consistent with their new knowledge ... to predict the future we have to reflect on when people are likely to lie and when they are most likely to tell the truth." (pg. 27)

"... engineering the future by exploiting leverage that really does not exist ... Raising the stakes helps flush out the bluffers ... Getting the best results [in bluff detection] comes down to matching actions to beliefs." (pg. 28)

"... what game theorists call a hand wave--that is, at some point the analyst waves his hands in the air instead of providing the logical connection from argument to conclusions." (pg. 29)

"... correlation is not causation ... decisions can be altered by the expectation of their consequences ... a superbly descriptive label for a problem in enforcing contracts. [Economists] ask, is the contract 'negotiation-proof'?" (pg. 31)

"Justice gave way, as it so often does in our judicial system, to the relative ability of plaintiffs and defendants to endure pain." (pg. 32)

"Agenda control--determining the order of decision making--can be everything." (pg. 42)

"... numbers are clear; words are vague." (pg. 52)

"... the CIA has checked out the risk that different experts give greatly different answers leading to greatly different predictions." (pg. 54)

"a lot of classified information is easily reproduced from open, public sources for those who are willing to work at it ... Everyone shares these two goals: get their preferred outcome, and get credit for any outcome." (pg. 55)

"... we can define a player's power--the pressure they really exert to shape the outcome--as equal to their influence multiplied by their salience [i.e. how salient the issue is for them]." (pg. 57)

"Framing the problem is usually the hardest part of the prediction and engineering process." (pg. 67)

"... an 'issue' is any specific question for which different individuals, organized groups, or informal interested parties have different preferences regarding the outcome, and for which it is true that an overall agreement cannot be reached unless at least a key set of players come to agreement on the question." (pg. 70)

"... to signal the other side that they are up against deep pockets that can endure high costs to fight the good fight. The message: 'We will keep you embattled in motions, countermotions, and delays until we break the bank. We can spend more than you.' ... playing the game called the war of attrition." (pg. 88)

"Imagine trying to win at chess when the rules for winning change with each opponent, as they do in the negotiating game!" (pg. 94)

"It takes a courageous person to defy one's own beliefs ..." (pg. 97)

"Sometimes it is worse to win in court than to accept a plea agreement, even when you are innocent." (pg. 100)

"The belief that good deeds, whatever their motivation, will elicit a good response, reflects optimism about human nature that sometimes is met by reality, but all too often is met instead with greed and aggression." (pg. 104-105)

"Management can be a profile in courage by cutting off revenues today to prevent bigger headaches tomorrow, but most profiles in courage, as it turns out, lose their jobs." (pg. 123)

"Models fail for three main reasons: the logic fails to capture what actually goes on in people's heads when they make choices; the information going into the model is wrong - garbage in, garbage out; or something outside the frame of reference of the model occurs to alter the situation, throwing it off course." (pg. 124)

"... an unusual stakeholder ... was content to fail while sticking to her principles." (pg. 127)

"There are two ways to maneuver into a winning position. One is to persuade others to adopt your point of view. The other is to adopt theirs." (pg. 128)

"... how can you predict the unpredictable? Well, although it is impossible to anticipate unpredictable developments, it is possible to predict how big an 'earthquake' is needed to disrupt a prediction." (pg. 130)

"Real people may not be able to do the cumbersome math that goes into a model, but that doesn't mean they aren't making much more complicated calculations in their heads even if they don't know how to represent their analytic thought processes mathematically." (pg. 135)

"... self-interest will beat out the collective good just about every time." (pg. 146)

"Getting some benefit sooner is always worth more than getting it later." (pg. 159)

"The beauty of a model is the freedom it gives us to ask lots of what-if questions." (pg. 161)

"... When a campaigner promises peace and prosperity, motherhood and apple pie, we don't really learn anything about what they plan to do." (pg. 166)

"... any predictioneer worth his or her salt must be willing to risk the embarrassment that comes from being wrong." (pg. 171)

"Just as modern-day central banks increase interest rates to slow growth, so the twelfth-century [Catholic] Church raised interest rates by denying heaven to those who lent money for profit." (pg. 210)

"The path to forgiveness ... generally included making financial restitution to the Church rather than to those from whom a profit had been made." (pg. 211)

"Two common ordeals, both supervised by the Church, involved submersion of the accused in deep water or forcing the accused to hold a red-hot piece of iron for a prescribed amount of time. Failure to stay submerged ... was taken as proof of guilt, as was the inability to hold the red-hot iron." (pg. 213)

"... exercises in what game theorists call cheap talk. Promises are easily made but not easily enforced." (pg. 222)

"To get everyone to agree to something potentially costly, the something they actually agree to must be neither very demanding nor very costly. If it is, many will refuse to join because for them the costs are greater than the benefits, or else they will join while free-riding on the costs paid by a few who were willing to bear them." (pg. 223)

"Cheating is an equilibrium strategy for many polluters, a strategy backed by the good faith and credit of their governments." (pg. 224)